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TAX-BASED INCOMES POLICY 
(TIP) AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO 
WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS 
Steven R. Hunsicker* 
Traditional theories of fiscal and monetary policy emerged 
from the decades of the 1970's with a considerable loss of credi-
bility. Until recently, economists and policymakers generally ac-
cepted the theory that careful manipulation of fiscal and mone-
tary policy could achieve an acceptable trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment by balancing aggregate demand and 
supply. This tenet was first shaken in 1970 when inflation rates 
did not drop appreciably during a recession. Increased unem-
ployment and substantial amounts of idle capacity did result in 
some moderation of wage and price demands, but inflation did 
not fall back to earlier levels.1 The same phenomenon recurred 
in the inflationary periods of 1974-75 and 1980. The persistence 
of inflation in a slack economy posed two significant problems 
for economic policymakers: (1) unemployment and inflation no 
longer exhibited a stable inverse relationship, and (2) given 
levels of employment witnessed increasing rates of inflation. 2 
The government often considers supplementary policies when 
fiscal and monetary policies fail. Collectively known as "incomes 
policy," such policies attempt to influence wage and price deci-
sions directly.8 Experience demonstrates that compulsory wage-
price standards, an extreme form of incomes policy, while per-
haps effective in achieving at least temporary price restraint, 
• Member of the California and District of Columbia Bars; B.A., 1972, University of 
Iowa; J.D., 1975, University of San Diego; LL.M., 1977, University of Pennsylvania. The 
views expressed are solely those of the author. 
' See Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisors, in [1981] PRES. EcoN. REP. 
40 [hereinafter cited as Economic Report of the President]. 
• See generally Bosworth, Economic Policy, in SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES, AGENDA 
FOR THE 1980s (J. Pechman ed. 1980). 
• Such policies are intended to both control inflation and lower levels of unemploy-
ment. Other goals associated with the implementation of incomes policies are (1) break-
ing the wage-price spiral through dampening of inflationary expectations; (2) alleviating 
the problems of a wartime economy such as allocation and capacity restraints; and (3) 
counterbalancing the administration of wages and prices by large economic units. See 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, INCOMES POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as CBO INCOMES POLICIES]. 
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generally impose unavoidable administrative costs" and eco-
nomic distortions.5 Recently, economists have suggested using 
the tax system to reinforce wage and price behavior meeting es-
tablished criteria. According to its proponents, such "tax-based 
incomes policy" (TIP) could reduce wage and price increases, 
thereby lowering inflationary expectations and decelerating the 
resultant wage-price spiral. Ideally, various groups in society are 
encouraged to accept lower wages and prices for the goods and 
services in expectation that the wages and prices they pay will 
also be lower. At the same time, TIP would impose fewer admin-
istrative and economic efficiency costs than wage and price stan-
dards. Opponents of TIP, however, consider such proposals to be 
mere variants of wage and price controls, unjustified by cost-
benefit analysis and contrary to a free market economy. 
Part I of this article will evaluate the major arguments oppos-
ing such policies against the background of the recent American 
experience with wage and price controls. Part II, in light of the 
applicability of these arguments to TIPs, will consider whether 
some variant of TIP could realize the claimed benefits while 
minimizing the economic and administrative costs usually asso-
ciated with wage and price controls. 
I. WEIGHING THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST INCOMES POLICIES 
Incomes policy can take various forms, including "jawboning" 
(exhortation coupled with adverse publicity for uncooperative 
firms or employee groups), voluntary wage and price guidelines, 
and mandatory wage and price controls or freezes. Even though 
every Administration from World War II through 1980-has used 
a form of incomes policy to supplement traditional fiscal and 
monetary measures,8 critics charge that wage and price controls 
' For example, the Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS) employed a staff of 
42 in 1974 which grew to 238 in 1979. By fiscal year 1981, CWPS had an annual budget 
of 9.4 million dollars. White House Fact Sheet on Termination of Certain Functions of 
the Council on Wage and Price Stability (January 29, 1981), reprinted in (1981) 5 FED. 
CONTROLS (BNA) 1051. 
• Economic distortions may occur in both the product and labor markets. In the prod-
uct market, controls programs invariably lead to misallocations of resources which may 
result in artificial scarcities. In the area of labor disputes, wage controls may have a 
debilitative effect on the "vigor" of the collective bargaining process. See G. SHULTZ & K. 
DAM, EcONOMIC POLICY BEYOND THE HEADLINES 71 (1977). 
• See Democratic Study Group Report on Mandatory Wage and Price Controls, re-
printed in (1980) 3 FED. CONTROLS (BNA) 419 [hereinafter cited as Democratic Study 
Group Report]. 
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have no place in an economy based on free enterprise concepts. 
Their attack focuses on two broad issues of controversy: whether 
control programs can ever be an effective approach to •fighting 
inflation, and the degree to which they impose unavoidable costs 
on the economy. 
A. Wage-Price Controls as "Quick Fix" 
A central criticism is that controls treat the symptoms of in-
flation, not the sources, by putting an artificial lid on wages and 
prices. Controls may in fact exacerbate the problem by building 
up suppressed demands that explode in worse inflation when the 
controls are lifted and by diverting attention from the real 
causes of inflation. 7 To support these arguments, opponents 
point to the consequences of the two most recent attempts to 
curb inflation: the mandatory controls of 19718 and the volun-
tary program of 1978.8 The "new economic policy" of 1971 had 
'Id. at 422. 
• With the exception of the controls imposed during 1971-74, mandatory wage and 
price controls have appeared in the last 40 years only during wartime. Policymakers 
deemed such measures necessary to ensure allocation of resources to the war effort with-
out risking uncontrolled inflation in consumer markets experiencing shortages. See id. at 
419. 
In 1971, a "new economic policy" attempted to reduce inflation without an accompa-
nying slowing of economic activity which would result in increased unemployment. On 
August 15, 1971, under authority provided by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 
U.S.C. § 1904 (1976), the Nixon Administration suddenly announced a 90-day freeze on 
all wages, prices and profits. The unexpected announcement of controls sought to pre-
vent anticipatory wage and price increases and to break inflation expectations and the 
consequential wage-price spiral. The purpose behind the 90-day limit on the duration of 
the freeze was to avoid potential economic distortions and market shortages. The freeze 
also provided time to establish the administrative apparatus for maintaining the stability. 
of wages and prices. Comprehensive mandatory wage and price controls followed the 
freeze with the goal of reducing inflation to an annual rate of two to three percent. The 
Cost of Living Council and a tripartite Pay Board regulated wages and salaries. However, 
the primary emphasis of the 1971 program was on the control of prices. "Allowable cost" 
rules permitted price increases in relation to unit cost increases. Thus, the controls regu-
lated prices on a firm-by-firm basis. In addition, a profit margin rule, intended to en-
courage profit increases through the expansion of sales and productivity rather than 
through increased prices, controlled prices indirectly. See CBO INCOMES POLICIES, supra 
note 3, at 28-43; Democratic Study Group Report, supra note 6. 
• In late 1978, a new anti-inflation program emerged that included explicit but volun-
tary numerical standards for wage and price increases on an annual basis. Initially, an-
nual increases in wages and private fringe benefit payments had a ceiling of seven per-
cent. The price standard required individual firms to limit their cumulative price 
increases for certain products over the next year to one half of a percentage point below 
the firm's average annual rate of price increase during 1976-77, the period selected as 
being representative of basic underlying cost and productivity trends in individual indus-
tries. Firms that could not meet the price "deceleration standard" because of uncontrol-
lable cost increases had to demonstrate that before-tax profit margins were no higher 
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as its main thrust the direct regulation of prices through a series 
of complex pricing rules.10 However, during the period immedi-
ately prior to the expiration of the program and for at least a 
year thereafter, a price explosion occurred. Inflation during this 
period was greater than it had been at any time since World 
War II.11 The voluntary 1978 anti-inflation program, which again 
attempted direct price control, could not contain the effects of 
the OPEC oil price increases in 1979. By the time the wage and 
price program entered its third program year, on September 30, 
1980, the Consumer Price Index was well into double figures. 11 
Critics cite these experiences as evidence that controls at best 
only delay price increases attributable to underlying inflationary 
forces such as excess demand and external shocks. Incomes poli-
cies, by artificially suppressing the true sources of inflation, such 
as world-wide food shortages, reliance on foreign oil, deficit 
spending, and declining productivity, eventually result in severe 
economic distortions and increasing rates of inflation. Therefore, 
critics deride controls as a simplistic "quick fix" that distracts 
attention both from the key sources of inflation and from appro-
priate but more difficult solutions-balancing the federal 
budget, developing alternative energy sources, and implementing 
than the average of the firm's profit margins during the best two of three fiscal years 
ending prior to October 1, 1978. 
Compliance with the wage and price standards was voluntary in the sense that non-
compliance did not result in civil or criminal penalties. At the same time, however, the 
Administration prepared a list of potential actions that it would take to provide incen-
tives for compliance. Such actions included: (1) a re-examination of various restrictions 
on import competition in industries in which wage or price increases are exceeding the 
standards, (2) a request that regulatory agencies evaluate the reasonableness of cost 
pass-throughs and other rate increase requests in ratemaking proceedings in light of the 
wage and price standards, (3) an examination of specific markets in which administrative 
regulations set minimum levels for prices or wages, (4) the publication of companies 
found to be out of compliance with the wage and price guidelines, and (5) the limitation 
of government procurement activities to firms that observe the wage and price standards. 
The Administration hoped that widespread compliance with the wage and price stan-
dards would reduce inflation in 1979 to the range of six to six and one-half percent. See 
White House Fact Sheet on President's Anti-Inflation Program (October 24, 1978), re-
printed in (1981] 5 FED. CONTROLS (BNA) 1001. 
•• See note 8 supra. 
11 For empirical studies of the controls, see authorities cited in ORGANISATION FOR Eco-
NOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, EcoNOMIC SURVEYS, UNITED STATES 45 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as OECD SURVEY]. 
11 By late 1980, many firms and workers perceived the voluntary wage and price guide-
lines announced in fall 1978 as a failure. This perception was self-fulfilling in the sense 
that workers and firms were no longer willing to moderate wage and price increases in 
the expectation that the standards would restrain inflation or in the belief that others 
would continue to cooperate with the voluntary program. Executive Order No. 12288 
issued by President Reagan on January 29, 1981, formally terminated the 1978 voluntary 
wage and price program. 46 Fed. Reg. 10,135 (1981). 
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strategies to deal with supply and productivity. 
This criticism of wage and price controls is particularly valid 
insofar as reliance on controls programs leads the federal gov-
ernment to unduly relax its monetary and fiscal policy.13 Unless 
a responsible fiscal and monetary policy to reduce excess de-
mand accompanies wage and price control, no controls program 
can be successful.14 Such criticism, however, is an insufficient ba-
sis to reject completely the use of incomes policies. Rather, 
policymakers should consider incomes policy as a potentially 
useful part of a multi-faceted economic strategy to combat eco-
nomic ills. 16 
Moreover, the recent American experiences with wage and 
price controls do not lead conclusively to the propositions that 
the opponents of the controls programs assert. On the contrary, 
past programs demonstrate that incomes policies do have a sig-
nificant impact on wage and price expectations and behavior. 
For example, the mandatory controls imposed during the Ko-
rean War are credited with having promoted economic stability 
for several years after the termination of the program. 16 Also, 
when a period of relatively high unemployment and price in-
creases in 1962 set the stage for voluntary "guideposts" for wage 
and price increases, 17 voluntary compliance, supplemented by 
occasional Presidential jawboning, achieved moderate price and 
wage increases through 1965.18 Even the much-maligned 1978 
anti-inflation program19 may have had a positive impact on con-
trols programs on wages and prices, at least during the first two 
•• G. SHULTZ & K. DAM, supra note 5, at 21; see also Bosworth, supra note 2, at 66-67. 
" See Pechman, Introduction and Summary, in SETrING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: 
AGENDA FOR THE 1980s, supra note 2, at 3. 
'" See Bosworth, supra note 2, at 64-69. 
•• Mandatory wage and price controls imposed in January 1951 followed a sharp in-
crease in the inflation rate after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Those 
controls achieved moderate success in dampening inflation associated with the war. Fur-
thermore, the controls did not cause shortages in particular markets or price explosions 
after the termination of the controls program. See CBO INCOMES POLICIES, supra note 3, 
at 10-13. 
17 In conjunction with expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, the guideposts at-
tempted to stimulate production and employment without generating accompanying in-
flation. The rate of overall productivity increase limited the wage increases in each in-
dustry in order to maintain stability of labor costs per unit of output for the economy as 
a whole. The price guideposts called for: (1) price reduction if the industry's rate of 
productivity increase exceeded that of the overall economy rate, (2) an increase in price 
if the rate of productivity increase was less than the overall rate, or (3) stable prices if 
the two rates of productivity increase were equal. Certain exceptions to the wage and 
price standards existed for hardship situations and where industries could not attract 
needed supplies of labor or capital. See [1962) PREs. EcoN. REP. 189. 
18 See generally CBO INCOMES POLICIES, supra note 3, at 13-27. 
10 See notes 9 and 12 and accompanying text supra. 
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years of the program. In its 1980 Annual Report, the Council on 
Wage and Price Stability20 concluded that the standards pro-
gram had induced considerable pay and price restraint with 
large attendant social benefits.21 While this conclusion was the 
subject of much dispute during the 1980 election campaigns, sta-
tistical analyses other than those conducted by the Council sug-
gested that the program had some impact in restraining the ac-
celeration of prices. 22 
Problems with past controls programs can be attributed to a 
variety of factors not inherent in incomes policies: mistakes in 
administering and designing the program, economic factors be-
yond the influence of the domestic economy, and the simultane-
ous adoption of stimulative fiscal and monetary policy. More 
fundamentally, however, the causes of the present inflation can-
not be attributed to excess demand and an effective policy re-
sponse requires more than traditional fiscal-monetary restraint 
to be effective.28 If now, as in the pre-World War II period, 
wages and prices were to exhibit a responsiveness to mild reces-
sions, the careful timing of traditional fiscal and monetary policy 
would result in a deceleration in inflation with only a moderate 
cost in terms of additional unemployment, lost income, and idle 
capacity.2• However, a large degree of inertia, reflected in down-
ward wage and price rigidity, characterizes the current inflation-
•• In August 1974, Congress established the Council on Wage and Price Stability to 
monitor inflationary developments in the economy. Its functions included the review of 
government and private actions that could impede the supply of materials and goods, 
educating the public on inflationary situations, publicizing the need for increased pro-
ductivity, working with management and labor, and gathering data relating to wages and 
"inflationary factors." The Council on Wage and Price Stability Act, however, made it 
clear that statutory authority for mandatory controls was not included. 12 U.S.C. §§ 
1904-09 (1976). Section 3b of the Act provides "Nothing in this Act ... authorizes the 
continuation, imposition, or reimposition of any mandatory economic controls with re-
spect to prices, rents, wages, salaries, corporate dividends, or any similar transfers." Pub. 
L. No. 93-387, 88 Stat. 750 (1974). 
11 Specifically, studies by the Council on Wage and Price Stability and the Council of 
Economic Advisors estimated that annual wage increases were one to one and one-half 
percentage points lower during 1979 than they would have been without the standards, 
and that the reductions in labor costs had been passed on to consumers through lower 
price increases. It was estimated that to achieve the same results using fiscai and mone-
tary restraint would have resulted in a one percent increase in the unemployment rate, 
with an accompanying two percent reduction in output, or $47 billion of lost Gross Na-
tional Product. See Economic Report of the President, supra note 1, at 59; COUNCIL ON 
WAGE AND PRICE STABILITY, ISSUE PAPER, reprinted in part in (1980] 3 FED. CONTROLS 
(BNA) 435, 440 [hereinafter cited as CWPS lssUE PAPER) . 
.. See OECD, supra note 11, at 46. 
13 For restrictive monetary and fiscal policies to cut the underlying inflation rate by 
one percent, an estimated one million more persons would have to be unemployed for at 
least two years. See Pechman, supra note 14 . 
.. See Economic Report of the President, supra note 1, at 44. 
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ary period. 211 Thus fiscal and monetary restraint, in order to be 
effective, must be more stringent than in the pre-World War II 
period, with greater loss of output and greater unemployment. 
This curious momentum in the inflation rate has been attrib-
uted to the inflation expectations of business and labor. As infla-
tion increases, the people's expectations of future increases in 
the inflation rate also rise. These expectations have their basis in 
opinion, rumor, and speculation rather than in fact. 26 Business 
and labor raise prices and wages in an effort both to "catch up" 
with past inflationary increases and to anticipate future in-
creases. 27 In addition, people are less likely to undertake the 
risky innovative investment necessary to maintain future pro-
ductivity growth.28 An effective incomes policy would diminish 
the self-fulfilling expectations caused by the wage-price spiral. 
Granted, no monetary, fiscal, or incomes policy, however well 
designed, can prevent the shocks to the economy from outside 
sources such as the OPEC oil price increases.29 Currently such 
outside supply shocks have the effect of reinforcing the upward 
momentum of the wage-price spiral.80 However, if incomes pol-
icy were successful in reducing the momentum and rigidity of 
wage-price expectations, the economy could absorb or "pass-
through" such shocks with less effect on the underlying inflation 
rate.81 
B. Economic Distortion and Administrative Costs 
The second broad issue is the question of the degree to which 
the imposition of wage and price controls produce unavoidable 
economic and administrative costs in the economy. Opponents 
of controls state that interference with the profit motive will 
force a decline in productivity, create shortages of goods and ser-
vices in certain markets,82 and result in a distorted allocation of 
resources. Such opponents often point to the experiences of 
World War II and the 1970's when many goods, such as beef, 
•• Id . 
.. Id. at 33. 
17 Pechman, supra note 14, at 3. 
18 Economic Report of the President, supra note 1, at 33. 
19 Id. at 48. 
•• See Bosworth, supra note 2, at 39 . 
., See Economic Report of the President, supra note 1, at 44-45. 
81 Shortages and declines in quality occur when business stops producing items made 
unprofitable by controls or where greater profits can be made by exporting goods to the 
uncontrolled foreign market . 
• 
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were in extremely short supply.88 Moreov_er, when profits are 
controlled, companies may be discouraged from undertaking 
productivity-enhancing investments making the anti-inflation 
program counterproductive in the long run. 
Critics also claim that controls cause distortion throughout 
the economy. One example often pointed to is the use of the 
"base period" concept.84 This approach to wage and price con-
trol, employed with the 1978 standards, sets a certain period of 
time as the benchmark for gauging wage and price hikes. The 
problem is that domestic and international economic and busi-
ness conditions are not constant. Earlier base periods may be-
come inappropriate for certain industries or particular compa-
nies. For example, the basic price standard of the 1978 
standards did not accommodate the rapid increase of raw mate-
rial costs (primarily energy) and the consequential acceleration 
of inflation811 that occurred shortly after the program was 
announced. 
A "base period" controls program must accommodate the in-
equities arising for industries or companies that experienced low 
levels of demand or extraordinary costs during the base period 
and the concomitant small price increases and/or low profits.86 
In addition, a large bureaucracy87 is necessary to administer ex-
ceptions to the general price and wage standards for those enti-
ties inequitably affected. This bureaucracy would create inertia 
to preserve its function and existence, making disengagement 
from what may have been intended as a temporary controls pro-
gram more difficult and controversial. 88 
Critics of wage and price controls, however, ignore that the 
magnitude of economic distortion and related administrative ex-
pense under controls programs depend on the economic condi-
tions existing when controls are imposed. 88 During the voluntary 
88 See CBO INCOMES Poucms, supra note 3, at 43 . 
.. See generally Kiely & Hunsicker, Is a Third Year of Pay/Price Standards Neces-
sary?, Legal Times of Wash., Aug. 11, 1980, at 9, col. 1. 
" The Council on Wage and Price Stability estimated that seven percentage points of 
the inflation rate in early 1980 were directly or indirectly attributable to soaring energy 
prices in 1979. CWPS ISSUE PAPER, supra note 21. 
36 See G. SHULTZ & K. DAM, supra note 5, at 69. 
87 Four thousand workers were employed during the 1970's control period, and federal 
costs ran to some $125 million annually. See Democratic Study Group Report, supra 
note 6, at 423. 
aa See G. SHULTZ & K. DAM, supra note 5, at 72 . 
.. In a sluggish economy, characterized by high unemployment, low production, and 
low plant capacity utilization, there is less likelihood of economic distortion. Where busi-
ness sales are depressed, companies will be less able to cut production or sales of less 
profitable items to specific domestic markets in an effort to maintain higher profits. 
/ 
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"guideposts" of 1962,•0 for example, economic studies credit the 
guideposts with restraining price and wage increases prior to 
1966, a period during which there was slack in the economy. 
Only when government spending associated with the Vietnam 
War and expanded social programs led to increased aggregate 
demand did the voluntary program become less effective in re-
straining wage and price increases. By 1967, it became obvious 
that wage and price guidelines could not restrain inflation while 
the economy operated at close to full employment and excess 
demand existed. •1 
The 1970 experience also supports this position, contrary to 
the assertions of the opponents of controls programs. Arguably, 
economic distortions during the early 1970's were most acute re-
garding food. These distortions, however, were primarily the re-
sult of substantial demand and world-wide food shortages.41 In 
addition, the 1970 controls were in place during a period of 
rapid economic growth stimulated both by fiscal and monetary 
policies and by world-wide post-war expansion. In fact, the 1970 
controls were intended to accommodate stimulative· monetary 
and fiscal policies deemed necessary to reduce the then existing 
unemployment rate of six percent.0 
To summarize, experience with wage and price controls dem-
onstrates that effectiveness depends heavily on existing eco-
nomic conditions. While controls cannot contain the inflationary 
wage-price spiral over extended periods without unacceptable 
cost, experience with both mandatory and voluntary programs 
indicates that some variant of income policy to reduce present 
inflationary expectations is an appropriate supplement to tradi-
tional fiscal and monetary policy. The conditions of excess de-
mand that both spawned past inflationary periods and over-
whelmed past control programs with distortions and shortages 
do not exist at this time. Rather, present excess industrial ca-
pacity, lack of excess demand, and high unemployment could al-
low the adoption of a flexible incomes policy that would not be 
accompanied by the economic distortion experienced during the 
1970's control period. 
•• See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra. 
" It has been suggested that this experience reflects the inability of guideposts to pre-
vent inflation in the face of excess aggregate demand. See CBO INCOMES POLICIES, supra 
note 3, at 23-27. 
" Id. at 42-46 . 
.. See OECD SURVEY, supra note 11, at 45 (citing EcoNOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 
101-02 (1972) and JOINT EcONOMIC COMMITl'EE, PRICE AND WAGE CONTROL: EVALUATION 
OF A YEAR'S EXPERIENCE (1978)). 
276 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 14:2 
II. TAX-BASED INCOMES POLICY IN THE BALANCE 
An alternative approach to wage and price controls discussed 
in recent years is a tax-based incomes policy or TIP.•• The fun-
damental rationale of TIP is that aggregate individual wage and 
price decisions contribute to generalized inflationary pressures. 
The theory is that by taxing or subsidizing wage and price ac-
tions, a TIP could induce less inflationary behavior.411 Tax rates 
could be increased for those whose wage or price increases ex-
ceeded specified norms, and/or decreased where wage or price 
decisions reflected the desired degree of restraint. 
A. Variations of the TIP 
Many variants of TIP are possible.48 Most proposals contem-
plate the administration of a TIP through the personal or corpo-
rate income tax systems, and on an enterprise basis to accommo-
date changes within a specific company. Average rates of wage 
or price increases within a firm would be evaluated against a tar-
get to determine tax penalties or rewards. This formulation al-
lows firms to change the relative pay and prices of workers and 
specific products. Under this approach, firms could still use 
merit pay plans and individual pay raises in excess of the target 
to promote productivity.41 As noted above, a TIP could impose 
penalties for wage or price increases above a target, reward in-
creases below a target, or combine the two approaches. The pen-
alty or reward could vary directly with the divergence from the 
target, or be fixed at a single level depending only upon whether 
the target or threshold is met. This choice between "reward" 
and "penalty" TIPs would allow policymakers to focus on em-
ployers or employees. 
Another variable is the choice between a wage TIP and a price 
TIP. Government experience with incomes policies suggests that 
a wage TIP would be easier to administer and would cause fewer 
" In recent years, a TIP approach to anti-inflation policy has received increasing at-
tention from economists, policy makers, and the press. See generally Seidman, Tax-
Based Incomes Policy, in CURING CHRONIC INFLATION 65, 67 (A. Okun & G. Perry eds. 
1978). Had the Carter Administration won re-election in 1980, some form of TIP may 
well have been proposed. See Economic Report of the President, supra note 1, at 67-68. 
.. For the case against use of the Internal Revenue Service as the administrative appa-
ratus for TIPs, see G. SHULTZ & K. DAM, supra note 5, at 83-84. 
•• See generally Seidman, supra note 44, at 67. 
" See Economic Report of the President, supra note 1, at 60. 
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economic distortions than a price TIP.48 As with all price stan-
dards, establishing price targets for various firms raises 
problems of defining prices, accommodating new products and 
quality changes in old products, and dealing with the inequities 
caused by defining allowable prices-in terms of a base period.'9 If 
the theoretical and empirical evidence suggesting that price in-
flation will decline automatically when wage inflation declines is 
correct,110 a price TIP would be unnecessary. 
Because a penalty wage TIP or a reward wage TIP can pro-
vide the same TIP incentive effect, the choice among a penalty 
or a reward or a combination thereof 111 depends on (1) the antic-
ipated effectiveness of each type of TIP and (2) the ever-present 
administrative concerns. Arguably, an employee reward TIP 
would encourage workers to cooperate with a voluntary incomes 
policy by compensating them for accepting lower pay increases,H 
and enhance effectiveness. An employer penalty TIP, on the 
other hand, would rely on employers' responsiveness to tax pen-
alties rather than employees' responsiveness to tax rewards. This 
penalty aspect may be essential to a high probability of eff ec-
tiveness, and would also bolster government revenues in the pro-
cess. Moreover, a TIP that penalized firms for excessive pay in-
creases could reasonably be limited to relatively large firms, thus 
limiting the administrative burdens to companies best equipped 
to handle them. &a 
Despite the merits of each proposal considered alone, combin-
ing the employee reward TIP with an employer penalty wage 
TIP has additional advantages. Worker incentives could be 
adopted to accompany an employer penalty TIP, 114 combining 
the attributes of both approaches. &11 
A third variable is whether a TIP should apply continuously, 
•• See id. at 65. 
•• See generally Kiely & Hunsicker, supra note 34. 
00 See note 59 infra. 
•• See Seidman, supra note 44, at 71. 
•• See Economic Report of the President, supra note 1, at 63. 
" See Dildine & Sunley, Administrative Problems of Tax-Based Incomes Policies, in 
CURING CHRONIC INFLATION 151 (A. Okun & G. Perry eds. 1978). Limiting the TIP to 
firms with more than 100 employees would cover more than 60% of total employment, 
but would eliminate 99% of businesses from the associated record keeping, reporting and 
auditing requirements. 
04 See Economic Report of the President, supra note 1, at 61. 
"" For example, a firm granting a wage increase in excess of the target wage inflation 
rate could be surcharged on its income tax in proportion to the excess. Wage increases 
less than this amount could be rewarded with proportionate tax cuts. Tax increases or 
cuts could be applied to the employees of firms granting increases above or below the 
target in order to provide an employee incentive. Id. at 60. 
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or only when a performance threshold is crossed. Under a con-
tinuous penalty TIP, tax rates vary directly with the degree of 
divergence from the wage target. Thus, a continuous TIP could 
provide constant incentives for wage restraint. A threshold ap-
proach would mean that exact increases in wages would not have 
to be tracked for every firm, leading to greater administrative 
efficiency. Internal Revenue Service audits, for example, could 
be restricted to firms near the threshold. 118 A threshold TIP, 
however, provides little incentive for a firm to approach the 
threshold target if the target cannot be met, or to practice fur-
ther pay restraint once the target is reached. Therefore, a con-
tinuous TIP may be more effective than a threshold TIP be-
cause only the former provides incentives to lower all pay 
increases. In addition, a continuous TIP could be less disruptive 
of the existing pattern of relative wages because a continuous 
TIP should exert similar downward pressure on all pay 
changes.117 
B. TIP Versus Traditional Controls 
Wage and price decisions are clearly a key element in the mo-
mentum of the inflationary process. Both traditional controls 
and tax-based incomes policies attempt to thwart inflation by 
affecting these decisions. On balance, the use of financial incen-
tives - direct inducements by a reward TIP and disincentives 
by a penalty TIP - seem more likely to be effective than a con-
trols program involving a high degree of government participa-
tion. In addition, a TIP would permit more flexible adjustments 
between companies and sectors than either voluntary or 
mandatory controls could achieve. 
The ultimate goal of a TIP, of course, would be to control the 
rate of price increases. The greatest advantage that TIP may 
have over wage and price controls is the possibility that TIP 
could achieve this goal by restricting increases in wages. rss A TIP 
could reward or penalize employers or employees for wage be-
havior, without including specific standards for price behavior. 
Thus a TIP could avoid the greatest problems associated with 
past control programs: difficulties in defining allowable price or 
profit increases, the administrative problems · of monitoring ac-
tual behavior, and the economic distortions and inefficiencies 
.. See id. at 62-63. 
•• See Seidman, supra note 44, at 97-99. 
08 Id. at 73, 84-90. 
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that accompany imposed price and profit limits. Price inflation 
reduction could be achieved if macroeconomists are correct in 
forecasting that price increases, two-thirds of which purportedly 
reflect labor costs, will decline automatically with restrained 
wage increases,119 Theoretically, price restraints would follow 
closely on the heels of initial wage slowdowns. This initial slow-
down coupled with the perception of TIP as an effective anti-
inflation program would favorably influence the inflationary ex-
pectations of workers.80 In a reversal of the wage-price spiral, 
decelerating prices and expectations thereof would result in ad-
ditional wage restr~nt in the second year after the enactment of 
TIP and further deceleration of prices. 
CONCLUSION 
As inflation has becoine less sensitive to induced reductions to 
aggregate demand, the traditional anti-inflation policy tools of 
fiscal and monetary restraint have become less effective and 
more costly in terms of lost output and higher unemployment. 
As a result, economic policymaking has faced the critical chal-
lenge of reducing inflation while maintaining a prosperous and 
11 See Gordon, Can the Inflation of the 1970s be Explained?, 1977 BROOKINGS PAPERS 
ON ECON. ACTIVITY 253. According to this theory, most prices (other than those of raw 
materials and agricultural products) are directly related to variable costs of production 
of which the largest are labor related. Given wages, prices are relatively insensitive to 
variations. 
If correct, this approach would not affect the relative distribution of income shares 
between wages and profits because prices would fully reflect the changes in wages en-
couraged by TIP. This conclusion assumes that TIP will not affect existing, relative mar-
ket power in the economy. 
Convincing labor of this relationship to assure cooperation would be critical to the 
adoption and viability of the program. A program of "real wage insurance" as was pro-
posed in 1978 for those who had observed the wage standard would encourage labor to 
support the program. This program, which was not adopted, sought to provide tax re-
funds to members of employee groups that complied with the seven percent wage stan-
dard if the Consumer Price Index increased by more than seven percent over the year. 
White House Fact Sheet on President's Anti-Inflation Program, supra note 9. In addi-
tion to "real wage insurance," tax cuts for workers in the event that price inflation ex-
ceeds wage inflation and a special tax surcharge on corporate profits that increase exces-
sively relative to wages are alternative possibilities. See id.; Okun, Incomes lnfiation and 
the Policy Alternatives, in THE EcoNOMISTS CONFERENCE ON INFLATION, 1 REPORT 365 
(1974); Klein & Duggal, Guidelines in Economic Stabilization: A New Consideration, 6 
WHARTON Q. 20-24 (1971). Whatever option may be deemed necessary, to authorize the 
labor protection at the same time TIP is enacted would be important to guarantee pro-
tection in advance, and to encourage cooperation. 
00 See Perry, Slowing the Wage-Price Spiral, in CURING CHRONIC INFLATION 50 (A. 
Okun & G. Perry eds. 1978). 
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growing economy. Incomes policies may present a useful supple-
ment to monetary and fiscal restraint. By encouraging groups to 
accept lower wages and prices in the expectation of reduced in-
flation, incomes policies reduce the cost of lost output and em-
ployment that result from any given level of demand restraint. 
Incomes policies also impose administrative and economic effi-
ciency costs, however. These costs tend to be highest where a 
rigid form of incomes policies, mandatory wage and price con-
trols, is employed. These costs can be reduced, if not eliminated, 
by encouraging wage restraint and associated price restraint, 
through the use of tax surcharges and/ or rewards. 
The administrative and efficiency costs associated with formal 
incomes policies tend to grow over time. For this reason, the 
costs of a permanent TIP may exceed its anti-inflationary bene-
fit at some point. A temporary TIP, however, would impose rela-
tively small costs at the outset of the program and, if successful 
in winding down the wage-price spiral, is worthy of serious con-
sideration as a complement to fiscal and monetary demand 
restraint. 
